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PLEADING "MATERIAL FAOTS"
H. C. DOWDALL

In several states, as for instance in Pennsylvania,1 New
York and Connecticut, the word "material" is used in order to define the character of the. facts which must be pleaded in an action.
The official use of the word "material" in this connection started
with the English pleading rule of 1875, the terms of which are
closely followed in the American rules above referred to. In England, both before 1875 and since, the word "material" has had an
ambiguous use which it is the object of this paper to explain. Further purposes are to explain the circumstances in which the word
was introduced into the rule, its interpretation in the English
courts, the reason why its meaning has been less litigated in England than in the States, as well as its logical meaning in pleading.
This logical meaning turns on the fact that all law, whether defined by statutory or by judicial legislation, is universal, general,
or, as the French say, abstract; that is to say, law provides for
events in terms of type, and rights and duties only arise when
events of the defined type happen to occur. Thus whenever any
particular claim is made, it must be based on particular facts of
I Penna. Practice Act of 1915, § s, P. L. 483, § 5,PA. STAT. (West, 192O)
§ 17185: "Every pleading shall contain and contain only a statement in a con-

cise and summary form of the material facts on which the party pleading
relies for his claim, or defense, as the case may be, but not the evidence by
which they are to be proved, or inferences, or conclusions of law . . .
(945)
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the prescribed type. Such facts are therefore the facts material
to the claim, for they are the facts which must be proved (facta
probanda) in order to establish the claim. The facts which are
material in this sense must therefore be ascertained by reference
to the particular claim which is made in the action, and the issues
raised thereon, as well as by reference to the general propositions
of the law; and they must be distinguished from facts which are
merely relevant to the proof (facta probantia).
It is necessary to state right away these somewhat obvious
propositions because, in England at least, their fundamental importance is often overlooked, with the result that "analytical
jurisprudence" fails to deal with practical difficulties and has
therefore fallen into well merited disrepute. But the propositions
stated will be found to solve many such difficulties and, in particular, those which beset the problem with which we are immediately concerned. The following pages will therefore deal with
them somewhat fully, as well as with the ambiguities of terminology with which that problem is obscured. As there is not anywhere, I think, a history of the transition from common law
pleading to "code" pleading in England, I have thought that
American lawyers might be interested to know what actually
happened; and though I am not competent to discuss all the
American litigation which has taken place on the subject of this
article, I have done my best to appreciate its effect, which seems
to confirm the views here expressed. The course of the argument will be more easily followed if the reader will kindly begin
by perusing the concluding paragraph to which it leads up.

T-E

STATUTORY OBLIGATION TO PLEAD "MATERIAL FACTS"

The difficulties which beset the formulation of issues for
trial are common to American and to English law. They are
often dealt with by rules which are on the whole very similar,
and it is likely enough that such rules often operate similarly
in practice, although in England, at least, it is not always found
easy to apply them with great logical precision. The problem
goes to the very heart of practice, for it is in reference to questions properly put in issue that discovery must be adjusted and
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the relevancy of evidence tested; and it is upon the proper determination of the issues raised that a judgment stands or falls
on appeal, so that the time of an appellate tribunal is often
wasted and new trials rendered necessary unless the issues have
been properly formulated in the court below. The matter therefore concerns everyone who has to do with legal practice, and,
although the use of common sense and experience may make it
possible to avoid or postpone consideration of the fundamental
difficulties, it is just these difficulties which, owing to their farreaching importance, are best worth discussing. Recent articles
in the learned publications of American lawyers 2 suggest that
there is still room for discussion of the subject, and it may therefore be of interest to consider the history, interpretation and
logical implications of the English rule regulating pleading in an
ordinary action in the High Court; for this rule brings to the
front all the fundamental difficulties which characterize the problem. Indeed it is only in so far as it raises these difficulties that
the rule will be of interest in America, and it will be sufficient
for our purpose to quote that part of the rules of the Supreme
Court 3 which raises them. It runs as follows:
"Every pleading shall contain, and contain only, a statement in a summary form of the material facts on which the
party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case
may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved."
It will be noticed that this rule is in its essentials identical
with the Pennsylvania rule quoted above, also with the New York
rule of 192,1, which provides that:
"Every pleading shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts without unnecessary repetition,
on which the party pleading relies, but not the evidence by
which they are to be proved." 4
'There must be very many of these, of which I have read the following:
(1917) 31 HARv. L. REV. So; Cook, Statements
of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes (ig2) 21 CoL L. REv. 416; Nathan
Isaacs, The Law and The Facts (igaz) _2 CoL. L. REv. i; Clarke, The Complaint in Code Pleading (i920) 35 YALt L. J. 259.
'RuLEs OF THE (ENGLISh) SuPRanEl CouRT (1883) order XIX, rule 4.
'N. Y. C. P. A. (x92o) §241.

Whittier, Notice Pleading
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And the Connecticut rule uses the word "material" in the
same way. Indeed, wherever code pleading is adopted, however
the terms employed may vary, the gist of the corresponding rule
is, so far as I know and so far as I can judge, usually much the
same. -In some cases the American rules are a good deal older
than the English, although, when this is so, they do not anywhere, so far as I know, use the word "material". The English
rule was made, as it stands, in 1883; 5 but it is substantially the
same as a rule schedule to the Tuclicature Act of x875,6 which it
superseded but which was then quite new. For the corresponding rule, schedule to the Judicature Act of X8 7 3 , 7 merely required from the plaintiff "a statement of his complaint and of
the relief or remedy to which he claims to be entitled," and from
the defendant "a statement of his defence"-in both cases "as
brief as the nature of the case will admit."
In order to understand the present rule we must therefore
consider how matters stood as regards pleading in the courts
which were consolidated by the Tudicature Acts. This is briefly
stated in the following terms in the FirstReport of the Judicature

Commissioners,which was published in 1869.
"The systems of pleading now in use, both at common
law and in equity, appear to us to be open to serious objections. Common law pleadings are apt to be mixed averments of law and fact, varied and multiplied in form, and
leading to a great number of useless issues, while the facts
which lie behind them are seldom clearly discoverable. Equity
pleadings, on the other hand, commonly take the form of a
prolix narrative of the facts relied on by-the party, with
copies of extracts of deeds, correspondence, or other documents, and other particulars of evidence, set forth at needless length. The best system would be one which combined
the comparative brevity of the simpler forms of common
law pleading with the principle of stating, intelligibly and
'Statute Law Revision and Civil Procedure Act, 46 & 47 Vict. C. 49

(1883).

'Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 77 (1875).
7Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66 (1873), Schedule,
Rules of Procedure, § 18.
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not technically, the substance of the facts relied upon as
constituting the plaintiff's or defendant's case, as distinguished from his evidence. It is upon this principle that
modem improvements of pleading have been founded, both
in the United States and in our own colonies and Indian
possessions, and in the practice recently settled for the Courts
of Probate and Divorce. We recommend that a short statement, constructed on this principle, of the facts constituting
the plaintiff's complaint, not on oath, to be called the Declaration, should be delivered to the defendant. Thereupon
the defendant should deliver to the plaintiff a short statement, not on oath, of the facts constituting the defence, to
be called the Answer. When new facts are alleged in the
Answer, the plaintiff should be at liberty to reply." 8
The Commissioners who made this report included the Lord
Chancellor Cairns and Sir Roundell Palmer, who succeeded him
in the chancellorship as Lord Selborne, and Lord Hatherley;
common law judges such as Lord Blackburn, Chief Justice Erle,
Lord Justice Bramwell and Lord Coleridge; and civilian judges
such as Sir Robert Phillimore and Sir James Wilde; so that it
would be impossible to have any more authoritative description of
the situation, but it is necessary for our purpose to go into the
matter rather more fully.
Inasmuch however as the works of Professors Thayer and
Holdsworth are equally familiar on both. sides of the Atlantic,
and as the object of this paper is analytical rather than historical,
very little need be added to what they tell us. That little will
largely centre around the ambiguous use of the word "material"
which is the cause of so much confusion that it seems to lie at the
root of half our procedural difficulties. This ambiguity may be
illustrated as follows.
AmBIGuous UsE OF THE WoRD "MATERiAL"

If a one-legged man strikes a woman and kills her, then the
fact that he has only one leg is material in the sense that it is
relevant to his identity, and if he is on trial for murder it is a
material part of the evidence against him. But the fact that he
'Page II.
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has only one leg is not a material part of the offence with which
he is charged. The distincdon is so manifest that it would be
absurd to allude to it if it were not often overlooked, and indeed
there are cases in which it is so much less obvious that a somewhat striking illustration has been given in order to make the
distinction dear. This is all the more necessary because the word
"material" is used, and has been used for at least three hundred
years, in both these senses, not only in the daily usage of bench
and bar, but also in legal literature. This equivocal usage has
indeed been so common and so well supported that it could not
possibly be described as improper; but in connection with pleading, with which we are now concerned, the latter of the two senses
above exemplified has, strictly speaking, a certain claim to be regarded as "proper". For, in the technicalities of pleading, whenever the word is used technically, it has been used almost exclusively in that sense for a very long time. Thus when Lord
Coke tells us that an issue must be single, certain and material, or
when in the great days of special pleading there was discussion
as to whether a traverse was on a material point, or whether a
variation was material, or the like, in all such cases the word is
generally used, and is often expressly used, to signify a point
which will be decisive of the action or one which is an essential
element of some claim or right, as distinguished from that which
is merely relevant to the proof thereof. But within this narrow
sphere itself somewhat guarded language must be employed; for
even in discussing traverse of a material fact we sometimes have
"the most material fact", a phrase which by its form almost negatives a strictly technical use. Indeed it is not until we come to the
English pleading rule that we have, so far as I know, what is a
definitely technical use, or at least a use which is so far technical
that the phrase "material facts" is specifically used in contradistinction to law, on the one hand, and to evidence on the other;
a contradistinction of which the technical implications will be
discussed later. Let us now consider how matters stood as regards pleading at the time when the JudicatureActs were passed.
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PLEXADING AT COMMON LAW

And first as to common law. The long story of common
law pleading has been told more than once-most completely and
most recently by Professor Holdsworth. The fullest account of
its detailed content in its palmy days is to be found in Comyn's
Digest; the most systematic account of it in Stephen on Pleading;
and the most perfect practical exposition of it, as it existed in its
final form, in the third (1868) edition of Bullen and Leake's
Precedents of Pleading.f When I was called to the bar in 1893
the portly form of Mr. Bullen was still to be seen in the Temple,
but to his collaborator, the author of Leake on Contracts, was
attributed most of the credit for the book. It could not be bought
under several times its original price, and I remember paying
£3. 1o.o for my copy at a sale in Chancery Lane, although everyone
kmows that an out-of-date law book does not often command a
fancy price for purely practical purposes. But although the new
system of pleading had then been in force for twenty years, no
one at the common law bar, umless he had large experience of his
own, felt safe with a pleading until he had seen how it would
look under the old system. Furthermore, the forms scheduled
to the statutory Rides of Court were found to be unsatisfactory,
and one of them was judicially held to be insufficient. What actually happened was what has often happened in similar circumstances before. The most experienced juniors (for in England
it is the special business of the junior bar to draw pleadings)
after consulting Bullen and Leake for the old practice, and after
consulting the new rules and scheduled forms for the new and
authoritative idea, used their common sense and devised new
forms or adapted the old ones. When these were found to work
well and without difficulties arising, they were copied by pupils,
some of whom became eminent and had pupils of their own who
copied and added to the collection. The process was continuous
and a tradition was set up. The close connection between careful
pleading and professional efficiency is illustrated by the fact that
nearly all of the precedents which I copied as a pupil in the way
9

BULLEN AND LEAxE, PRECEDENTS OF PLEADING (3d ed. x868).

the last edition. in which Mr. Leake collaborated.

This was
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above described were the work of men who, having been good
pleaders in youth, became eminent judges later on, as, for instance,
J. C. Bigham (now Lord Mersey), Gorrell Barnes (afterwards
Lord Gorrell), W. R. Kennedy (afterwards Lord Justice), Joseph
Walton (afterwards a judge), William Pickford (afterwards
Lord Sterndale), J. A. Hamilton (now Lord.Sumner), Maurice
Hill (now a judge). Nine-tenths of my collection bear the names
of these men who, although they belong to the modern period
of pleading, were strongly under the influence of the old tradition which at least had the merit of producing great lawyers and
a great legal system. Of course different men excelled in different departments of law; but sooner or later precedents of all kinds
found their way into the modern practice books, such as the newer
editions of Bullen and Leake, which in course of time superseded
the great third edition of the original authors with which we are
at the moment concerned.
OLD FoRms OF PLEADING AT CoMMoN LAW

The form of these older precedents, although they were from
time to time regulated in certain matters by rules made by the
judges, such, for instance, as the famous Rides of Hilary Term
z834, were not based on comprehensive rules of general application but on the common law, and were adapted in accordance with
the requirements of particular decisions of the courts. Their
general nature is described, in terms more sympathetic than those
quoted above from the Report of the Royal Commissioners, by
the editors of the fourth edition of Smith's Leading Cases (Willes
and Keating) both of whom became judges and one of them a
judge of the first magnitude. They say1 0 that such pleadings
should be true and perspicuous, "adopting the well known and
understood formula used for the sake of brevity in cases of frequent occurrence, and, where there is no such formula, stating
the material facts as they can be proved to exist in intelligible
language." The use of the words "material facts," in the sense
above described' as appropriate in pleading, will be noticed; and,
10i Siulnr,

LF-uING CAsS

(Willes & Keating's ed.) io3.
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if comparison be made between the precedents of today and the
old forms used in those cases where the material facts were set
out, it will be found that the difference, although important as
regards prolixity and clearness and often in other ways, is less
striking than might have been expected by anyone who has been
accustomed to regard the change to the modem system as revolutionary. The great change was in the abolition of the "well-known
formula" or "common counts" and of the plea of the "general
issue." The great objection to these was, of course, that they
only set out what is often described as a conclusion of law, and
did not specify the facts relied on. Thus, as Dr. Odgers in his
well-known book on pleading 1 1 observes, upon a count for
"money had and received" there was no indication as to whether
the claim was (a) against a rent collector for rents collected and
not handed over; or (b) for fees collected by the defendant under
claim of an office claimed by the plaintiff; or (c) for goods paid
for and not supplied; or (d) for money paid to the defendant on
supposing him to be someone else; or (e) etc., etc. This drawback has been removed, and the convenience of the old system, in
appropriate cases, preserved, by the method known in English
procedure as special indorsement of a writ. In these appropriate cases the statement of claim is indorsed on the writ of summons and may be for "money had and received" or the like, but
particulars are given which correspond niore or less in extent
with such particulars as are supplied (if I rightly understand it)
under the system of Notice Pleadingadvocated by Mr. Whittier 12
and adopted in the State of Michigan and the City of Chicago.
Indeed, I sometimes wonder whether the inconvenience of the old
common counts has not been exaggerated. For if you sue your
rent collector who has not handed over your rents, he probably
has a fairly good idea of what your grievance is. But, however that may be, no one now defends the common counts in
their old unparticularized form. The damage that they, more
than any other part of the old system, have done, and continue
to do, is of a much more subtle and far-reaching character. For
' ODG-s, PmVADG AN)

Whittier. supra note

2.

PRAc iC

(gth ed. 1926) 87.
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they have given an ambiguity to the conception and to the use
of the word "evidence" which makes clear thinking about legal
problems quite impossible unless it be thoroughly understood and
perpetually borne in mind.
AMBIGUITY OF THE WORD "EVIDENCE"

This ambiguity of the word "evidence" is closely related to
that of the word "material" which has been alluded to above,
and will best be realised by reference to the books on Nisi Prius
Evidence from Buller (1772) down to date. In all of these it will

be found that what is really an account of the law, e. g., the law
relating to money had and received, is there described as the evidence by which such a count may be sustained. Thus proof that
goods have been ordered, paid for, and not delivered is described
as "evidence" of a count for money had and received. That is
to say, what under the present rules would be described as the
material facts of a case, and distinguished from the evidence by
which they are proved, are, in an important class of books which
are much used by the profession, described as the evidence of a
legal conclusion. The cause of this description is of course historical, but the present absurdity of it did not escape the vigilant
eye of Bentham. Writing in 1827, in his Rationale of Judicial
Evidence,'3 he says:

"The question on what facts a decision turns is a question not of evidence, but of the substantive branch of the
law: it respects the probandurn,not the probans."
This is obviously true. But the truth had to be rediscovered by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen fifty years later; -1 and
neither he nor Bentham nor any other writer that was, or is, or is
to be, is the least likely to alter the long-established usage of the
profession, however ambiguous and confusing it may be. It is
found not only in the old civil and criminal practice books of days
gone by, such as Buller, Starkie, and Phillipps; but also in those
"BENTHAM,

56o. 1

'STEzE E,

RATIONALE OF JuDIcIAL EvimxEm (Bowring's 7th
DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENcE

ed. 1827)

(1877) viii, et sqq.
I
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now in use, such as Roscoe's Nisi Prius and Archbold's Pleading
and Evidence in CriminalCases, where we find treated under separate headings "evidence in general," meaning thereby the method
of proving that something has happened; and "evidence in particular actions," or "in particular offences," or as may be, meaning thereby a description of the kind of facts (material facts)
which if ever and whenever they happen to occur give rise to
various causes of action, or as may be. The dark places of the
law would indeed be illuminated if this ambiguous use of the
words "evidence" and "material" were abandoned. But that is
not in the least likely to occur. Even an act of Parliament must
bend before an established usage of words. Thus in the Sale of
Goods Act, r893,15 a warranty is a term of the contract which is
not a condition of the contract, so that a breach of it does not
go to the heart of the contract; but in the Marine Insurance Act,
x9o6,18 a warranty is a condition on which the contract stands,
so that the contract does not hold at all if it be untrue. Both acts
were drafted by the same brilliant and experienced draftsman,
Sir Mackenzie Chalmers, with his eyes wide open. The case we
are considering is not however quite so desperate, because the ambiguous usage has no statutory support, and is inconsistent with
the present statutory pleading rule, and is altogether less definite
and less flatly contradictory. But the confusion is all the more
insidious and dangerous on that account. It may perhaps be summarised as follows. If the words "material facts" properly signify facts which establish or modify a legal right or duty, then
those words, although sometimes used to denote facts which
merely go to prove the existence of material facts, are not used to
the exclusion of their proper meaning. And if the word "evidence," when applied to facts, properly means probative facts,
then, although it is sometimes used to signify the material facts
(facta probanda), it is not so used to the exclusion of its proper
meaning. Of course all that is possible in this place is to point
out the ambiguities and to bear them constantly in mind.
'56 & 57 Viet. c. 71, §62 (1893).
" 6 Edw. VII, c. 41, §33 13] (1906).
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Us13 OF THE WORD "MATERIAL"' IN THE CwumixAL, EQUITY,
AND CIVILIAN COURTS

As regards the other courts which were consolidated by the
Judicature Acts, very few words will suffice; and they will again
be directed to the use of the word "material."
In the criminal courts the word is used much as in the other
common law courts, often loosely, but when the meaning is specific it has what has been described above as the "proper" meaning. Thus successive editions of Archbold have, for a hundred
years, told us that when the defendant in a criminal case pleads
the general issue the prosecutor must prove "every fact and
circumstance in the indictment which is material and necessary to
constitute the offence," a sentence in which the words ".material
and necesssary" seem to mean "material, that is to say, necesessary.
Dean Langdell " has described the development of chancery
procedure, after it began to be formal, on the lines of the canon
and civil law. But I do not think that the word "material" comes
from either of those sources; first, because I have not found it
there; secondly, because the method of "pleading out a clean issue,"
to which it seems to owe such technical use as it has, was not the
method of medieval Roman law; and thirdly, for other reasons
which need not be specified, e. g., the ecclesiastical use of "material fault" for an irregularity of external conduct lacking culpable
intention. When the word materia or inateriasufficieius is found
in Latin precedents of English common law pleading, it should
be remembered that law Latin comprehends, as Lord Coke tells
us, "not only that which is authorised by the grammarians, but
also words of signification well known to the sages of the law."
Of course the ultimate origin was the Latin word, but the immediate source is, I imagine, a common English use-perhaps no
more recondite than, as we might say, "that which matters,"
though of course lawyers were trained in the logic which contrasted matter and form and were familiar with the distinction
ITLangdeI1, The Development of Equity Peading From Canont Law Pro-

cedure, reprinted in 2 SELsCr EssAYs ix ANc.wo-AmucAx LEGAL HsTOPY

(19o8)

753.
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between fallacies in -reand in dictione. In its chancery connection,
when the word appears in Section Io of the Chancery Procedure
Act, 1852,1- it will be noticed that it'has not a very specific or
technical sense, the object of the provision apparently being merely
that the pleader should keep to the point. The section provides
that the bill shall contain as concisely as may be "a narrative of
the material facts, matters, and circumstances on which the plaintiff relies."
What has been said as to chancery applies equally to the
courts centred around Doctors' Commons which have been merged
in the Probate, Admiralty and Divorce Division. Without having made special search, I think it may safely be said that neither
the word nor, except in a very general way, the idea of materiality is to be found in the ecclesiastical or civilian courts; and
when the Acts of 1857 transferred their jurisdiction to the new
courts, these adopted a new system of pleading more akin to that
of the common law courts. 19 The word "material" does not
occur in those acts, nor in the rules which were made by the
judge in pursuance of the powers thereby conferred upon him;
but the precedents of pleadings appended to the rules do set out
what are in fact the material facts in the cases provided for. The
use of the word in Section 7 of the Matrimonial Causes Act,
i86o,- 9 does not suggest that the word was one of technical significance in that court. It provides for the rescission of a decree
nisi when it has been "obtained by collusion, or by reason of material facts not brought before the court .
.
and any person may give information of any matter material to the due decision of the case." 21
THE DRAFTiNG OF THE PRESENT ENGLIsH PLEADING RULE
These then were the circumstances in which the new rule
was drafted. As regards the actual drafting of the rule,
much more information than is available would be welcome. We
"iS & 16 Vict. c. 86, §X (i852).
AND BRoorcs, PROBATE PpAcrIcE (i86s) 724.
& 26 Vict. c. 9i, §7 (x86o).
' I am indebted to Mr. William Geddes, of the English Chancery bar, for
some of the references in this section.
"DODD
025
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know from the judgment of Lord justice Brett in Philipps v.
2 that "great pains were taken" to draw the rule; and
Philipps-"
that "the distinction is taken in the very rule itself, between the
facts on which the party relies and the evidence to prove those
facts. Erie, C. J., expressed it in this way. He said there were
facts that might be called the allegata probata

.

.

.

and

they were different from the evidence which was adduced to prove
those facts. And it was upon that expression of opinion of Erie,
C. J., that rule 4 was drawn. The facts which ought to be stated
are the material facts on which the party pleading relies." Of
course Chief justice Erie was then the more important man of
the two, but Lord Coleridge was also a member of the Royal Commission, and we know from the introduction to Sir James Fitzjames Stephen's book on evidence that Lord Coleridge and Sir
James were at that time in conference on the draft of a bill in
which, following the Indian Evidence Act,2 3 the clear and dominant distinction was made between "facts in issue" and facts
relevant thereto. And furthermore, the Royal Commissioners
refer to practice in the TJnited States, meaning, I suppose, those
states which had before 1869 adopted code pleading. I do not
know whether the New York code of that period was typical,
but it required a "statement of the facts constituting each cause
of action," a phrase which seems to imply a distinction from facts
merely relevant but which do not constitute a cause of action.
Indeed the distinction is so radical that one is surprised that it
should have presented itself as a discovery to Stephen. Hints of
it go back at least as far as the Fourteenth Century, when Bartolus pointed out that one fact may be proved by another; and
the application of it occurs in many contexts, so that it seems
almost incredible that the clear antithesis between factum probandum and factum probans should not go further back than
Bentham; but I cannot remember having come across it before
then.
Nothing is said by anyone, so far as I know, as to how or
why the word "material" came into the rule. But Brett, L. J.,
=4 Q. B..c.27, 133,

134
(

a878).

= STE:EN,, op. cit. supra note 14, at i.
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in the passage above quoted, seems to equate the "material facts"
of the rule with the allegata probata (meaning, I suppose, the
allegata probanda) referred to by Erle, C. J., and the reasons
for this equation .will be sufficiently clear from what has already
been said.
INTERPRETATION OF THE ENGLISH PLEADING RULE

Let us turn now to the interpretation of the rule by the courts
after it had actually come into operation. Here again my own
experience must have been typical. Instruction to draw a pleading is often, as it was with me, the first professional commission
of a newly called English barrister. I haturally asked the distinguished junior, now a distinguished judge, to whom I was
pupil: "What is meant by the material facts which the Rules
require me to plead?" He answered: "I don't know. Give me
the papers and I will tell you." Perhaps the same answer would
be made today, not only in" England, but also in similar circumstances in the States. The practice in a matter of daily importance
is bound to settle down; and convenience in practice may well be
the best criterion of excellence. The courts exist to dispose of
business and not to discuss metaphysical niceties. And furthermore, it may be that a strictly logical interpretation, if rigidly
enforced, would produce impracticable consequences. But all the
same, "great pains" were taken by very eminent men in the drafting of the rule; and it has been enacted. It has a meaning, even
if the meaning is not very precise, or, if precise, not very strictly
enforced. It must however be borne in mind that this rule is only
one of many among which it takes its place and in relation to
which its practical operation has to be considered. Demurrer is
abolished, and its place is taken by an objection in point of law
which may be disposed of at, or (in certain circumstances and, in
fact, very rarely) before the trial. There is liberal power of
amendment which is freely exercised, the cost of an adjournment, if necessary, being often the only penalty on the party
seeking amendment. The power to punish prolixity in pleading
by costs is practically a dead letter. The power to order "further and better particulars" of any matter alleged in the plead-
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ings is daily exercised on a large scale; and on the other hand,
the power to strike out any matter in a pleading which is "unnecessary or scandalous or which may tend to prejudice, embarrass,
or delay the fair trial of the action" is rarely now invoked. In
these circumstances it is perhaps hardly surprising that the number of reported cases on the construction of the rule which we
are now considering is not very great, or the result of them very
narrowly conclusive as to its exact meaning. If demurrers were
re-established, and if the bar were set to work to attack every
pleading on the ground that something more or something less
than "material facts" were alleged, then the meaning of those
words would be known with much greater precision than is at
present common. Much credit is deservedly given to the English rule and the way in which it has worked, but this is not
alone due to the magic of its terms, but also to the favourable
circumstances in which it operates.
It was avowedly a main object of the rules that each side
should know what case he had to meet at the trial, and there are
dicta which might lead one to suppose that' "material" meant
material for this purpose. Thus Cotton, L. J., says: 2 4 "The
statement of claim must set out all the facts material to prevent
the defendant from being taken by surprise." Such an interpretation might possibly be taken as supplementary to the main gist
of the rule and might jusify, if such justification were necessary,
the established practice by which facts in aggravation or mitigation of damages are pleaded, though not essential to the existence of a cause of action nor affording a complete defence. But
it is clear from the rule itself, and from the interpretation of it by
the courts, that the material facts are the facts relied on for the
claim or defence, i. e., in the words of the Royal Commissioners
and of the old New York rule, as constitutingthe claim or defence
as distinguished from the proof of it. The English cases are so
few, and there appears to have been so much litigation in America, that they are perhaps equally familiar, and the decisions so
far as they go equally matter of course, in both countries. I do
not think that the English cases throw much light on many of
-'Philipps v. Philipps, supra note 22, at 138.
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the problems that have been so much canvassed in the States. The
only considerable practical problem of doubt or difficulty has been
in regard to matters in aggravation or.mitigation of damages, and
the Court of Appeal has held that these are not mere proof of the
measure of damages, but, so to speak, aut6nomous elements of
the claim or defence and therefore to be pleaded as material facts.
There are, on the other hand, no end of English decisions as
to the cases in which "further and better particulars" of facts alleged in a pleading will be ordered, and the extent to which, and
the time at which, they will be ordered. But that is a matter of
convenience rather than principle, and does not concern us here;
for, so far as the constitution of a cause of action goes, the time
and place and particular details are immaterial.
THE LOGICAL MEANING OF THE WORDS "MATERIAL FACTs"

With this rather long preamble let us now turn to what is
really the subject matter of this paper, namely, the principle involved in any rule which, however it may be worded, distinguishes facts from law, and facts which establish a right from
those which merely prove it. Such facts may be called material
facts, or constitutive facts, or ultimate facts, or issuable facts, or
traversable facts, or by any other name, but it will be convenient
here to adopt the description of the Pennsylvania, New York,
Connecticut and English rules, and to call them material facts.
In these and other rules there is generally no explicit distinction between facts on the one hand and law on the other. But the
distinction is always implicit, and I gather that it is judicially recognised in America, as it certainly is in England.2 5 It will, in any
case, provide the most convenient approach to our whole problem, for the solution of it goes far to elucidate the distinction between material facts and facts which are merely probative.
Vhat then is the essential difference between law and fact?
The distinction is, as it seems to me, so confused by Austin's
theory of law that it is necessary (though it seems almost
'North Western Salt Co., Ltd. v. Electrolytic Alkali Co., Ltd., [1913]
3
a.B. 422, 425, where Farwell, L. J., says: "The pleader must plead facts,
not law."
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brutal to do so) to attack that discredited theory on the somewhat limited ground still remaining to it. For surely Austin goes
too far when he describes as "improper" and "merely metaphorical" the perennial usage of Europe and America by which the
"laws of nature" are so described. Of course, there are distinctions between the laws of. a state and the laws of nature whichi are
so radical that it is the first business of legal analysis to clearly
distinguish the two. But there is a logical reason why they are
both called laws, and that reason is very relevant to our present
purpose. A law is always hypothetical. It is always a case of
"if ever and whenever." 26 If ever and whenever a heavy body
is unsupported it will fall to the ground. If ever and whenever a
man breaks a contract he will, if required, be made to pay damages. The one law is an observation and the other an observance,
but in both cases it is hypothetical. The law of contract would
remain in force even if all men fulfilled their contracts; but it
remains merely dispositional and does not come into active operation until the fact or event for which it provides actually happens. In this respect there is the same difference between, say,
the law of murder and the fact of murder that there is between
the law of gravitation and being hit on the head by a falling bale
of cotton. How then can provision be made in the abstract for
events which may happen in the concrete?
There are only two possible ways, namely, by verbal definition in terms of type, and by authoritative concrete illustration
of the type provided for. These are respectively known as statutory and judicial legislation.
In the case of statutory
legislation the legislature might, for instance, say: "If ever
and whenever a workman meets with an accident arising out of
his employment his employer shall pay him reasonable compensation." In order to bring about judicial legislation to the same
effect one must imagine a court receiving proof that a workman
had in fact met with an accident which in fact arose out of his
employment and thereupon holding, with the force of a binding
precedent, that it was an implied term of the contract of employ'ODowdall, Anatomy of a Body Politic (92)
37 L. Q. REv. 163; Dowdall, The Present State of Analytical urirudence (1926) 42 L. Q. REv. 451.
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ment that the employer should pay him compensation. In the
former case the abstract proposition is defined in words; in the
latter an illustration is provided, and when a sufficient number of
illustrations have been provided the abstract proposition may be
inferred therefrom. A very simple mathematical illustration will
make clear this distinction.
The general form for the equation of the circle is:
X2 + y 2 -a

2

which, in so far as it is a direct definition in abstract terms, corresponds with statutory legislation. On the other hand if you
put a round coin on a piece of paper and prick holes around the
edge and then remove the coin, you will observe that the points
fall on a curve which you will recognize as a circle of which the
equation is:
X2 + y2 = a 2
This corresponds to the process of judicial legislation by which
binding precedents are made and the abstract principles of the
law inferred from the decided cases; although it must be admitted
that the guidance of a coin is more certain in determining the pin
points on a regular curve than is the logical consistency of the
judicial bench in determining cases on principles which can be
inferred therefrom. The analogy also suggests that the law is
not only more certain but more simple than it is. I once heard
Lord Sterndale observe that the common- law consists of about
half a dozen obvious propositions, but that unfortunately no one
had yet been able to discover them. In actual practice lawyers
have rarely to do with such straightforward positions as belong
to a circle. The law is, so to speak, made up of all kinds and
fractions of curves which the pressure of circumstances prescribes,
and it is not easy to see the pattern of the whole. Let us therefore return to our practical illustration taken in a very curtailed
form from the English Workmen's Compensation Act,2 7 and
see how the processes of statutory and judicial legislation work
together and produce that domain of "mixed law and fact" which
is the most difficult part of the problem presented by "material
facts."
-h6 Edw. VII, c. 58 (i9o6).
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Statutory provision is made in case of an accident "arising
out of" employment. The type of event provided for is prescribed
in those words, and the law as it left the legislature was in that
form. The question whether a particular accident arose out of
the employment might have been left as a pure question of fact
without any more specific guidance as to the intention of those
words. Some people think that it would have been as well if the
matter had rested there, but heavy and well-organized interests
were involved on both sides and fate decreed otherwise. The
formal words of the statute became (like the common law formula
of "money had and received") the subject of authoritative illustration by means of judicial decisions, and the significance of the
words was thereby accurately defined as a matter of law. The
type of accident provided for by the statute became increasingly
specific by means of judicial legislation, and in the process the
terminology of the common law was often employed. Thus just
as payment for undelivered goods was described as "evidence"
of money had and received, so the fact of an accident caused to
himself by a young workman larking at his work might be described as "no evidence" of an accident arising out of the employment, meaning thereby that the accident lacked the material elements which would bring it into conformity with the type contemplated by the statute.
The problem presented in such cases is sometimes described
as a "mixed question of law and fact"-an expression which deserves more careful analysis than it has received. Indeed the
science of analytical jurisprudence would gain in credit with the
profession if it addressed itself to the solution of questions such
as this. In order to do so properly it would be necessary to examine more carefully than I have done the circumstances in which
great judges have used this and similar phrases. But it is certain
that Lord Mansfield, in 1786, when dealing with the question of
probable cause in a case of malicious prosecution, observed that:
"The question of probable cause is a mixed proposition
of law and fact. Whether the circumstances are true is a
matter of fact; but whether, supposing them true, they
amount to probable cause, is a question of law." 28
Johnstone v. Sutton, x T. R. 493 (1786), aff'd, i T. R. 784 (1786).
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By questions "of law" and "of fact" he probably means "for
the court" and "for the jury," -for that is the effect of the decision; so that perhaps "mixed proposition of law and fact" here
means no more than a proposition part of which is for the court
and part for the jury. But Professor Thayer has shown that
the distinction betveen law and fact and "for the court" and "for
the jury" do not coincide; and the expression "mixed question
(or proposition, or averment, or conclusion) of law and fact" is
now used with a different significance. If it be true, as I think
it undoubtedly is, that law is abstract and fact concrete, it is certain that they cannot be "mixed," and judges who use the phrase
"mixed question of law and fact" are often careful to repudiate
the phrase "question of mixed law and fact." The "mixed question" may, I suppose, mean "partly of law and partly of fact", or,
"involving both law and fact"; but as every judicial decision involves both law and fact it probably means a question in which
law and fact are involved without being discriminated.
Now the character of involving without discriminating law
and fact is the distinguishing mark of all judicial legislation. The
decision is binding in all cases in which the facts are substantially
identical; but the law (though often expressed by the judge in
what Scottish lawyers describe as his "opinion") is technically
implicit in the decision, and a large number of decisions may be
necessary before the legal principles which are involved clearly
emerge. If only a few pinpricks are made around a coin you cannot say, on removing the coin, whether the pattern of the points
indicates a circle or some other curve.
But let us suppose that judicial legislation as to the nature
of an accident "arising out of employment" has proceeded so far
that a number of principles have emerged, and that if the statute
were redrafted a more elaborate phrase would take its place. And
let us further suppose that the ordinary pleading rule applied toworkmen's compensation cases, and that it was strictly enforced.
Would an allegation that the accident "arose out of the employment" still be a sufficient allegation of the relevant material fact;
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or ought the description of the accident to follow the more elaborate form of the developed law? On the one hand it might be
said that when the words "arising out of employment" have received elaborate judicial interpretation they become a technical
legal phrase, and so allege a "conclusion of law." On the other
hand, it may be said that all words carry implications more or
less precise and that they retain their value as a sufficient description of what is specifically held to fall within their scope, although
the ordinary meaning of them may have lost something in the
process. Speaking for myself, the latter view seems to be clearly
right, for in order to involve an averment of law in an averment
of fact it is necessary to use language in which a legal proposition
is implicit.
Take an ordinary claim for personal injuries caused by negligence. If the accident is due to the dangerous condition of the
defendant's premises where it occurs, so that the plaintiff has no
cause of action unless the defendant has a particular duty towards
him, then this latter is a material fact and must be pleaded. So,
too, in a case of damage to goods, if the negligence is that of a
bailee for reward, from whom more is expected than from a
gratuitous bailee, then the fact of reward, if relied on, must be
pleaded as a material fact, and particulars of it will, if necessary,
be ordered. But in all cases of negligence, whether the duty is or
is not due to "all the world," and whatever the standard of diligence may be, departure from the standard of reasonable care is
the material fact which is bound to be in issue, and the theoretical
question of pleading is whether it is sufficiently pleaded as "negligence," (of which particulars must be given), or whether the
episodes of the story causing the damage should be set out as
the material facts relied upon.
It is true that the word "negligence" and the phrase "so negligently that" seem rather comprehensive, and they have certainly
received much judicial interpretation. But the word "fact," like
"action," is one which is more or less comprehensive according to
the circumstances in which it is used. Thus we may speak of a
naval engagement as an "action," and of the Great War as a
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"fact," just as well as we may describe the orator's action in
thumping on the table at the end of his speech as a fact. And
as regards the judicial interpretation of what may amount to
"evidence of negligence" in various circumstances, this always
turns on the circumstances which merely illustrate the material
fact. The standard of reasonable diligence remains the abstract
standard of the law, although authoritative illustration gives precision to the type of diligence contemplated thereby. And if a
(comprehensive) fact be proved which does not conform to the
type, instead of saying that there is no evidence of negligence, it
would conduce to clarity of thought if it were said that the fact
proved was not material to the claim advanced.
Considerations such as these might perhaps be brought forward in justification of the English practice whereby negligence
is pleaded as the material fact (and full particulars given for the
purpose of notice and convenience) in preference to the allegation of the particulars as themselves being the material facts.
AMERICAN LAW

I have purposely avoided reference to cases, generally arising out of averments in common law actions (such as the allegation of "valuable consideration," "negligence," "reasonable,"
etc.) which have given so much trouble in the States, as I cannot claim any lmowledge of American law; but if there is any
force in what has been said as to hypothetical cases based on an
English statute, I cannot see why it should not apply equally in
any common law case.
It has been suggested that I should compare the American
and English decisions on the points raised in this paper. But
unfortunately I cannot get sight of many American reports; I am
not qualified to discuss American law; and of course I should
not in any case venture to debate American decisions. The following observations may however be made.
For reasons stated in the paper, the English cases are few,
and (except as regards pleading matters in aggravation or miti-
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gation of damages) do not bear on the American difficulties. When
the present rule came into force the judges hoped that there
would not be many applications for particulars, which however
soon became common and are now extremely numerous. The
early cases raise the question whether a pleading is "embarrassing" by its vagueness or ambiguity, not whether it is quasi-demurrable for not stating the material facts. Nowadays practically all the cases are as to particulars, and are decided on the
basis of notice and convenience rather than legal sufficiency. If
a pleading is insufficient it is generally very impolitic to raise
the point before the trial, when an amendment will if necessary
generally be allowed, and the interlocutory point disappear. On
the other band if "evidence" is pleaded the opponent welcomes the
information and, as the costs of such "prolixity" are negligible,
nothing more is heard of the matter.
The American cases, on the other hand, often expressly raise
the point whether a pleading is bad (i)as stating a "conclusion
of law," or (2)' as stating merely probative as distinguished from
material facts.
As regards (i), words do not become a "conclusion of law"
merely because they have been judicially defined and are to that
extent technical. But on the other hand in order to know what
are the material facts of any case it is all-important to know what
is the matter for decision in that case. Thus in an action claiming property, ownership is a conclusion of law-the very matter
to be concluded by the action; but in an action for damages, the
ownership of the damaged property is generally no more than a
material fact.
As regards (2), the rigour of the rule is mitigated by holding that where a material fact is to be presumed from probative
facts, then an allegation of those probative facts is impliedly an
allegation of the material fact; but this does not solve all the difficulty or go to the root of the matter. It would seem that a fact is
material if it is an essential ingredient of the claim itself, but that
it is merely probative if its importance is contingent and depends
on its relation to other facts, for the importance of a fact as evidence depends on its relation to other facts so that it is not in itself an essential element of a legal right.
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CONCLUSION

In conclusion I would submit the following definitions:
I. Material facts are particular facts corresponding with the
type prescribed in general terms by the law as essential to the
existence or extent of any legal right or duty.
2. The material facts of a case ate the facts relied on as
material and advanced in support of a claim submitted for judicial
determination.
3. Relevant (or probative) facts, i. e., "evidence" as that
word is used in the pleading rule, are facts which, according to
the law of evidence, are relevant to the proof of the material
facts of a case, and to which testimony may be directed in the
same way as to the material facts.

